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ABSTRACT 
 
The lesson from abundant history is that, despite decades of constructive innovations 
in international loan and bond contracts involving sovereign financial obligations, 
lawyers, bankers, analysts and investors are best advised to operate under no 
illusions: Sovereigns are indeed sovereign. To those who harbored the hope that 
Argentina’s bad behavior as a sovereign debtor was a major exception that would 
not soon be repeated, the case of Ecuador’s latest default on shaky claims of the 
“illegitimacy” of some of its obligations demonstrates that while the absence of 
sovereign willingness to pay remains rare, it is not rare enough. These rogue 
sovereign debtors can be effectively restrained only by the forceful actions of other 
sovereigns, bilaterally or multilaterally, but in this case, in a repetition of attitudes 
shown toward Argentina since 2002, the international official community not only 
failed to condemn Ecuador’s actions, but actually expressed verbal and provided 
financial support. The government in Quito gathered no plaudits from the many 
national and international NGOs that have been campaigning for the massive 
forgiveness of developing-country debt, but at least this attitude is understandable: 
the case of Ecuador did not lend itself to arguments in favor of repudiation on 
“odious debt” or any related grounds. Above all, the country provides a useful, 
cautionary tale of the bad things that can happen to good sovereign debt contracts. 
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Multinational corporations were meant to be reassured by the protections 
incorporated into bilateral and regional investment agreements, but judging from the 
growing number of claims filed with ICSID and other arbitration vehicles (such as 
the UNCITRAL conciliation rules) – more than 300 treaty-based, investor-State 
disputes as of the end of 2008 – it is evident that many corporations have found out 
the hard way that sovereign states are not always suitably restrained by the 
international treaties they have signed and ratified.
1
 
Likewise, private-sector commercial bank creditors, bondholders and suppliers – 
even official (bilateral and multilateral) lenders – have come to learn by repeat 
experience that financial contracts entered into by sovereign borrowers, no matter 
how airtight and well intentioned at the time they were crafted and signed, can be 
perverted or ignored by governments lacking in ability or willingness to pay. 
This article illustrates the point by focusing on the case of Ecuador, a country 
whose governments have defaulted nine times on foreign-currency bonds and 
numerous times to foreign commercial bank creditors and others, such that the 
sovereign has been in default for at least 109 out of the last 183 years – namely, at 
least sixty percent of the time from 1826 through 2009.
2
 By its own reckoning, the 
government has been in arrears on interest payments to some foreign creditor or 
another in each and every year starting in 1987.
3
 
The lesson from abundant history is that, despite decades of innovations in 
international loan and bond contracts involving sovereign financial obligations, 
courtesy of some of the best minds in New York, London and beyond, lawyers, 
bankers, analysts and investors are best advised to operate under no illusions: 
Sovereigns are indeed sovereign. To those who harbored the hope that Argentina’s 
bad behavior as a sovereign debtor was a major exception that would not soon be 
repeated, the case of Ecuador should persuade them that while the absence of 
sovereign willingness to pay remains rare, it is not rare enough. As we have argued 
previously, notwithstanding the best of legal contracts and the surrender of sovereign 
immunities under New York, English or other foreign law, in actual practice, rogue 
sovereign debtors can be held to account or effectively restrained only by the forceful 
actions of other sovereigns.
4
 During the 19
th
 century, this was sometimes 
accomplished by the successful exercise of military force, and during the 20
th
 century 
through the application of diplomatic, trade and financial sanctions or incentives, 
whether unilaterally or through multilateral organizations. 
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I 
THE GOOD INTENTIONS 
 
After repeated refinancings and deferrals of debt service-obligations to foreign 
commercial banks, and the accumulation of sizeable interest arrears (particularly 
during 1987-1994), the government of Ecuador finally reached a comprehensive debt 
forgiveness and restructuring deal in 1995, under the aegis of the Brady Plan. The 
terms agreed reflected creditor concessions that were more generous than those 
granted to any other Latin American government up to that moment; in particular, the 
Discount bond accepted by creditors willing to give up claims on principal owed 
involved a 45 percent “haircut” rather than the usual 35 percent. As was the case in 
other Brady Plan applications, the various securities issued in exchange for old 
defaulted loans (in this instance, the Par, Discount, Past-Due Interest and Interest 
Equalization bonds) incorporated a number of legal innovations designed to make 
them virtually inviolable in any future economic emergency. First, they were freely 
transferrable bonds listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange, precisely so their 
ownership could change over time and they would not be easily traceable for the 
purpose of getting them restructured again. Second, the bonds that involved debt 
forgiveness or concessional interest rates and had very long grace periods and 
maturities (the Pars and Discounts) were backed in part with good collateral (U.S. 
government zero-coupon bonds), such that future governments would not be tempted 
to default merely to avoid servicing them. And third, the new bonds contained “exit 
covenants” by which the obligor pledged neither to ask for a future restructuring of 
the securities nor to request additional funding from the holders of the bonds.
5
 
In addition, the Ecuador and other loan-for-Brady-bond exchanges were 
accompanied by concrete steps and pledges of improved macroeconomic policies 
and market-friendly structural reforms that would enhance the ability of governments 
and their successors to service the new financial obligations until their eventual 
maturity. In Ecuador’s case, good progress in terms of economic stabilization and 
structural reforms was made ahead of the Brady Plan’s implementation, with the 
support of the Washington-based multilateral agencies, such that the IMF was twice 
moved (in 1992 and 1994) to endorse a rescheduling of debts owed by the 
government of Ecuador to the official foreign aid and export financing agencies 
represented at the Paris Club. However, in 1995, the debt relief obtained was 
squandered via increased military spending following a brief border war with Peru, 
and what had been a duly balanced government budget during 1993-94 became a 
string of deepening fiscal deficits – and renewed foreign indebtedness, including for 
armaments. Battered also by drought-related power shortages and the adverse 
repercussions of the financial crisis in Mexico, the economy stagnated that year and 
the country’s vice president, who had been the driver of market-friendly economic 
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reforms, fled Ecuador to evade arrest on charges of corruption.
6
 
Notwithstanding the good intentions incorporated into the 1995 debt relief 
operation, by 1999 Ecuador was in very serious – indeed, far more serious – financial 
trouble. A decline in world oil prices, damaging floods occasioned by the El Niño 
weather phenomenon, a drop in capital inflows in the wake of the Asian and Russian 
financial woes, a major domestic banking crisis, and loose fiscal and monetary 
policies all combined to push the economy to the brink of ruin. During the second 
half of that year, Ecuador became the world’s first government to default on its Brady 
bonds, as well as on two Eurobonds that had been issued in better days (1997), and on 
dollar-denominated domestic obligations maturing in the short run. In a desperate 
move, the economy was officially dollarized (as of January 2000), and soon after the 
president was deposed and replaced by his vice president, but as financial stability 
and improved macroeconomic policies took hold, the IMF offered its financial 
support in April of that year – provided that substantial debt relief was obtained from 
foreign private creditors.
7
 
In July of 2000, and with the IMF’s backing, the government sought and obtained 
a second round of principal forgiveness from its creditors estimated at around 40 
percent of face value. Bondholders were presented with a take-it-or-leave-it 
exchange offer whereby they would get new, uncollateralized obligations due in 
2030 paying very little interest, at least in the initial years, in exchange for their 
long-dated Brady bonds to which a heavy discount was applied, and also in exchange 
for their short-dated Eurobonds to which no discount was applied. If creditors opted 
instead for a bond paying a high interest rate and maturing in 2012, they had to 
concede an additional 35 percent “haircut” on the principal owed by Ecuador. Some 
97 percent of all bondholders accepted the exchange offer, which gave Ecuador 
substantial debt reduction as well as significant cash-flow relief in the initial years.
8
 
The new bonds incorporated contractual innovations meant to reassure investors 
that the risk of future losses would be minimized, and that the new securities had 
upside potential. As recounted by the venerable Lee Buchheit, New York counsel to 
the Republic of Ecuador, “A deliberate effort was … made to include structural 
features in the new bonds that would reduce the likelihood that the debt stock would 
become the subject of a third round of debt relief in the future.”9 The first legal 
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9
 Id. at 19. 
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innovation was to incorporate a pledge that if there should be a default on the 2030 
bonds during the first decade after issuance that was not cured within one year, 
Ecuador would compensate bondholders: it would grant them additional 2030 bonds 
under a sliding scale starting with an extra 30 percent of bonds if the default took 
place in the first four years after their original issuance. This principal reinstatement 
provision sought not only to reassure investors that granted debt forgiveness that a 
meaningful portion of their original claims against Ecuador would be restored in case 
of a default, but also to discourage future governments from defaulting by making it 
expensive for them to do so.  
The second legal novelty was to include a binding commitment that Ecuador 
would repurchase both the 2012 and 2030 bonds by a specified percentage of the 
amount outstanding in each year starting six and eleven years after their issuance, 
respectively. These mandatory buybacks (at secondary-market prices) were to set 
investors’ minds at rest that the aggregate amount of the government’s bonded debt 
would be gradually reduced to a smaller, more manageable size before their maturity, 
and to reassure them that by its actions the government would help to bolster the 
price of these securities in the secondary market. Ecuador’s failure to meet the debt 
reduction targets in any one year would trigger a mandatory partial redemption of the 
bonds at par. However, this novelty was potentially quite advantageous also for 
Ecuador, because it allowed the government to satisfy its amortization commitments 
by purchasing the bonds and retiring them whenever they traded at a discount in the 
secondary market – which they usually did, at prices in the range of 50-60 cents on 
the dollar. If ever the 2012 or 2030 bonds were to trade above par, the government 
could always make the amortization payments at par.
10
 
With the IMF’s blessing, the Paris Club subsequently refinanced accumulated 
arrears and maturities through April 2001, but it did not grant any debt forgiveness, 
just as it had not done so in the early 1990s. And yet, Ecuador’s interest and principal 
arrears to official creditors were more than twice as large as they had been to 
commercial banks and bondholders.
11
 Evidently, while Ecuador was deemed (by the 
United States and European governments, as well as the IMF’s management) to be 
insolvent enough to deserve major write-offs from private creditors twice in five 
years, it was considered solvent enough not to deserve write-offs from official 
creditors even once – despite being in the midst of arguably the country’s worst 
economic crisis. As we have pointed out elsewhere, this was one of several instances 
where the Paris Club’s principle of “comparable treatment” proved to be a highly 
discretionary, one-way street.
12
 
In the event, it would take less than a decade for investors in Ecuador bonds 
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(vintage 2000) to come to regret ever owning the new and supposedly 
much-improved securities. 
 
II 
THE BAD OUTCOMES 
 
In late 2008, the current populist government of Ecuador headed by President 
Rafael Correa defaulted on the 2012 and 2030 sovereign bonds, claiming they were 
immoral and illegitimate obligations. At no point before or after the default, when 
said bonds were repurchased by the government indirectly (through the secondary 
market) and also directly (through a buyback for 35 cents on the dollar), as explained 
below, did the government assert that servicing these obligations posed a financial 
hardship. There was no objective basis for doing so: in 2008, the public external debt 
was the least burdensome it had been in over three decades, relative to government 
revenues or the gross domestic product. Moreover, the country’s central bank held 
more freely disposable international reserves ($6.5 billion) than it had ever 
accumulated before. Thus, the default was not the (usual) consequence of a 
sovereign’s inability to pay. It was also out of character relative to Ecuador’s many 
prior defaults, which had taken place during fiscal and economic emergencies. 
During the period 2000-2005, the government’s external public indebtedness 
remained fairly steady at about $11.25 billion, and then declined $10.1 billion by the 
time of the default, as repayments exceeded new disbursements because rising world 
oil prices provided a fiscal windfall that minimized its borrowing needs. Since 2000, 
the economy expanded steadily and the market value of Ecuador’s gross domestic 
product ballooned from an abnormally depressed $16 billion in 2000 to $55 billion 
by 2008. Consequently, by the time President Correa announced the default, the ratio 
of external public debt to GDP had dropped sharply from over 70 percent in 2000 to 
a very manageable proportion of under 20 percent in 2008 (see Figure 1) 
 
Figure 1: Ecuador’s External Public Debt (as percent of GDP)* 
 
* Including any interest or principal arrears. 
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, authors’ calculations. 
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Servicing this external indebtedness imposed an increasingly lighter burden on 
the country and its public finances, especially given the rapid growth of government 
revenues during the intervening years, from $4.1 billion in 2000 to an estimated 
$17.8 billion by 2008. The interest bill averaged $1 billion in 2000-2001, but then 
started to drop and settled at less than $700 million per annum during 2002-2008. As 
a proportion of government revenues, interest payments dropped from over 23 
percent in 2000 to under four percent by 2008, and in relation to GDP, they fell from 
six percent to nearly one percent (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Interest Payments on Ecuador’s External Public Debt* 
 
* Including any interest arrears. 
Source: Banco Central del Ecuador, authors’ calculations. 
 
In particular, 2012 and 2030 bonds, which accounted for nearly one-third of the 
external public debt as of end-2008, required annual interest payments of $331 
million, the equivalent of a mere 1.9 percent of 2008 government revenues and 0.6 
percent of 2008 GDP – a relatively insignificant amount by any standards. Even 
though revenues and GDP are estimated to have dropped somewhat in 2009, the 
burden of interest payments on the 2012 and 2030 bonds would not have increased 
appreciably in the absence of a default. 
To understand the genesis of this decision to default out of unwillingness rather 
than inability to pay it is necessary to paint a brief profile of President Correa. He was 
born in 1963 in the coastal city of Guayaquil to a family of modest means, and 
throughout his formative years – until age 28, in fact – he attended, or was otherwise 
affiliated with, Catholic schools and universities, mostly run by the Salesians, the 
largest Catholic missionary order. This upbringing included spending one year in a 
mission at a social center run by the Salesians in Cotopaxi province, where Correa 
empathized with the native population when he saw their extreme poverty up close. 
In a speech delivered recently at Oxford, entitled “My Experience as a Leftist 
Christian in a Secular World,” President Correa stated that his “economic principles 
are based on the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church and on Liberation 
Theology.” He denounced the very unequal distribution of income in Latin America 
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and said that, “as a practicing Catholic, I will always believe in the importance of 
charity and solidarity,” and he pledged to keep ruling “with a clear preferential 
option for [helping] the poorest and the forgotten and [for] prioritizing human beings 
over [the owners of] capital.”13 
Vice President Alfredo Palacio, a cardiologist with no business experience, 
“discovered” Correa in 2003, at which time Correa was an economics professor and 
consultant, and he retained him as his economic advisor on the issue of how to set up 
and pay for a universal health-care system, which had been an electoral campaign 
promise that Palacio had made. At the time, funding for social programs was limited, 
and resources that might otherwise be available were not within reach because a 
portion of oil-related revenues were being deposited into a government fund known 
as the FEIREP. It was set up in 2002 largely for the purpose of generating the fiscal 
savings necessary to pay for the debt buybacks committed to as part of the debt 
restructuring of 2000. Palacio and Correa tried to tap into the FEIREP but were 
unsuccessful.
14
 
In March 2005, Correa presented a foreboding paper at a meeting held in Quito to 
discuss Latin America’s foreign debt problems sponsored by CLAI, a regional 
council of Christian churches. It was entitled “Debt Exchange: It’s All About the 
Creditors,” and in it Correa denounced the 2000 restructuring as having delivered 
insufficient relief because, to begin with, Ecuador’s obligations should have been 
written down to then-prevailing prices in the secondary market – precisely the kind 
of massive forgiveness that, he wrote, Argentina was rightly demanding at the time 
from its creditors. Correa went on to denounce the FEIREP for starving the country 
of funds for social programs and for enriching bondholders by having boosted the 
market price of Ecuador’s debt.15 
A few weeks later, on April 20, 2005, Palacio was appointed to the presidency 
when the legislature removed the incumbent, Lucio Gutiérrez, following a week of 
growing popular unrest with his government, and as political retribution against what 
was perceived as dictatorial decisions made by President Gutiérrez in prior months. 
And Palacio, in turn, appointed Rafael Correa as his finance minister. As such, 
Correa wasted no time in proposing to the legislature the abolition of the FEIREP, 
which it did in June while setting up an alternate fund (named CEREPS) largely to 
underwrite social spending. This was done even though the FEIREP, which had 
accumulated $1.1 billion during its nineteen months of existence, had not spent a 
single dollar to buy back any foreign debt. According to the World Bank, the fund 
had been turned into “the piggy bank to finance the liquidity needs of the central 
                                                          
13
 Rafael Correa, My Experience as a Leftist Christian in a Secular World, address before the Oxford 
Union Society, October 26, 2009, available at 
http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/pdf/Discurso%20ingles.pdf. 
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 FEIREP stood for “Fondo de Estabilización e Inversión de los Recursos Petroleros” (Stabilization 
and Investment Fund for Petroleum Resources). See Alfredo Palacio, Vida Política, available at 
http://www.dralfredopalacio.org/actividades.htm. 
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 Rafael Correa, Canje de Deuda: Todo en Función de los Acreedores, LA INSIGNIA, June 20, 2005, 
available at http://www.lainsignia.org/2005/junio/econ_008.htm. 
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government.”16 Correa also denounced the prior administration’s supposedly secret 
consent to various policy conditions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank; 
threatened to withhold debt-service payments to the multilateral agencies if they did 
not fulfill their loan commitments; and raised the possibility of bypassing the 
multilateral agencies altogether and selling bonds to Venezuela, instead. 
In late July, the World Bank made it known to Minister Correa that it would not 
authorize the disbursement of a $100 million loan he was counting on. Correa fired 
off an angry letter to World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, telling him that the Bank 
had offended Ecuador by reneging on the loan and demanding to know precisely why 
the disbursement had been cancelled. A couple of days later, having set himself 
proverbially ablaze, Minister Correa tendered his resignation at the request of 
President Palacio, whose office let it be known that the minister had failed to keep his 
superior properly informed of his (inflammatory) activities. During his 106 days in 
office, Correa managed to ruin the government’s access to external funding, but by 
wrapping himself in the national flag to confront the Washington multilateral 
agencies supposedly on behalf of the dispossessed of Ecuador, he had also succeeded 
in gaining national name recognition – thereby setting the stage for his candidacy in 
the next presidential elections. Upon departure, Correa’s popular approval rating was 
57 percent, the highest among cabinet members and nearly twenty percentage points 
higher than President Palacio’s own.17 
Rafael Correa would go on to win the presidential elections held in November 
2006, and his inaugural address on January 15, 2007 presaged his get-tough attitude 
with foreign bondholders. He stated that one of the main challenges facing Ecuador 
was to overcome a culture of issuing debt abroad, which had left the country saddled 
with “a very costly overindebtedness” – a gross factual misrepresentation. He said 
that a country’s debt service should be subject to a sustainability criterion; for 
example, debt service burdens should not be incompatible with the achievement of 
the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals. And third, he stated that part of 
Ecuador’s foreign debt was illegitimate, had been acquired under dubious 
circumstances, was not used for its intended purposes, and had been “repaid several 
times” already. Ideally, President Correa acknowledged, governments should be able 
to appeal to an impartial and transparent international tribunal that would decide 
which obligations should be serviced and what was a country’s objective capacity to 
pay. He noted, however, that such an impartial third party forum does not exist, and 
there is only the IMF, “which represents the creditors.” This is why, Correa 
concluded, his administration would engage in a “firm and sovereign renegotiation 
of the external debt, in particular of the inadmissible conditions that were imposed on 
us in the debt exchange of 2000.”18 
Nearly six months later, on July 9, 2007, President Correa issued a decree 
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 World Bank, Ecuador Country Economic Memorandum, May 15, 2006, 33, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEXPCOMNET/Resources/2463593-1213987636514/02_Ecu
ador.pdf. 
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 Choike, La Renuncia de Rafael Correa, Ministro de Economía de Ecuador: ¿Un Ejemplo de la 
Influencia de las IFIs?, August 16, 2005, available at http://ifis.choike.org/esp/informes/134.html. 
18
 Radio La Primerísima, Discurso Completo del Presidente de Ecuador Rafael Correa, January 15, 
2007, available at http://www.radiolaprimerisima.com/noticias/8555. 
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authorizing the creation of an “Integral Auditing Commission for the Public Credit” 
(known by its Spanish acronym, CAIC), and charged it with determining the 
“legitimacy, legality, transparency, quality, efficacy and efficiency” of the domestic 
and foreign public debt contracted between 1976 and 2006, taking into consideration 
“the legal and financial aspects, and its economic and social impact on regions, the 
ecology and various nationalities and peoples.” It was to analyze not just each bond 
issued at home and abroad, but also each and every loan contracted with official 
bilateral and multilateral agencies, as well as with commercial banks and suppliers, 
during the past three decades. The CAIC was to determine who had authorized the 
indebtedness in question; whether the requisite feasibility studies had been 
conducted; what conditions had been imposed; to which purpose the funds had been 
allocated in actual practice; the comprehensive (“integral”) impact of each project 
thus underwritten; and so on and so forth. And it was to accomplish this mission 
within one year, although later on the CAIC was given an extra couple of months – 
until the end of September 2008 – to achieve what any reasonable observer would 
regard as a “Mission Impossible.”19 The CAIC was not even allocated any funding to 
hire a staff until December 2007. Nevertheless, it managed to deliver a preliminary 
report in February 2008, a second draft in July, and its final report in November 
2008. 
The CAIC’s designated members were four representatives of the Correa 
administration, including the then finance minister, plus six Ecuadorians and three 
foreigners from social organizations who had worked on debt issues. However, none 
were professional auditors and all had a long history of militancy in the debt 
forgiveness/repudiation movement (e.g., in Jubilee, Eurodad and LATINDADD). 
The CAIC was chaired by then Finance Minister Ricardo Patiño, an extreme leftist 
who in his early years had joined the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and had later 
held a post in the Sandinista government’s land reform agency. Upon returning to 
Ecuador, he set up the country’s Jubilee 2000 office, a member of the international 
coalition movement that called for the cancellation of Third World debt by the year 
2000.
20
 Minister Patiño was forced to resign as finance minister within weeks 
because of a scandal involving the alleged manipulation of Ecuador’s bonded debt, 
but he was given another cabinet post by Correa, and despite the appearance of 
impropriety and of a conflict of interest, he was kept as the chairman of the CAIC.
21
  
                                                          
19
 CAIC, available at 
http://www.auditoriadeuda.org.ec/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=35&id=51
&Itemid=55.  
20
 Diario Hoy, Funcionarios “Clave” Están Más Cerca de Correa, available at 
http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/funcionarios-clave-estan-mas-cerca-de-correa-284778-2
84778.html. 
21
 A month after becoming finance minister, Patiño had said he might delay a $135 million interest 
payment on the foreign debt, but then he did not, which led to wild swings in the value of 
Ecuador’s bonds and of derivatives linked to them, raising suspicions of a deliberate market 
manipulation. In May 2007, a video surfaced of a meeting between Patiño and three others in 
which the minister appeared to discuss a plan that would enable certain investors to make a great 
deal of money from the bond price swings. Minister Patiño denied any wrongdoing, but after 
Congress censured him in July 2007, another video surfaced showing him arranging a backroom 
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The CAIC’s report was written in great haste, without the benefit of having hired 
professional auditors, interviewing public credit officers, finance ministers or living 
presidents from the 1976-2006 period, and obtaining access to many important 
documents.
22
 The report’s authors reveal that they requested information from 
eighteen government agencies but never heard back from three of them, were given 
information that was not relevant by eleven of them, and only obtained the 
documents they were seeking from just four agencies. In particular, the armed forces, 
known to have contracted many a foreign loan for the purchase of armaments, as 
confirmed by documents held by the finance ministry, had the audacity to issue a 
statement to the CAIC stating that they “had not found any documentation that 
details any loans received from foreign commercial banks during the period 
1976-2006.”23 
As was to be expected given the circumstances, the CAIC report is incomplete, 
biased, and inaccurate. For example, the first misdeed it identifies involves none 
other than the United States Federal Reserve, which is accused of “illegally raising 
interest rates” and thereby causing Ecuador’s debt to snowball during the late 1970s 
and early 1980s.
24
 The accusation of illegality is ridiculous, of course. Moreover, a 
factual analysis based on official Ecuadorian statistics that are publicly available 
reveals that the temporary hike in U.S. interest rates under Chairman Paul Volcker 
might be related to only a fraction of the debt build-up that took place in those years. 
Ecuador’s public external indebtedness grew to $5 billion as of end-1982 from less 
than $2 billion as of end-1978, but only about one-third of this increase could be 
justified by the need to borrow to cover the higher interest payments.
25
 Besides, 
while U.S. interest rates were being hiked, Ecuador was simultaneously benefiting 
from a doubling in its oil export revenues, such that the government should have been 
                                                                                                                                                                  
deal with the head of Congress. Patiño remains a member of President Correa’s cabinet, as 
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able to afford the higher interest bill without recourse to extra borrowing.
26
 
Moreover, despite a near halving of U.S. rates between the end of 1982 and the end 
of 1987, the government’s external debt went on to double to $10 billion. In sum, 
there is no basis for pinning Ecuador’s debt snowball on the Federal Reserve. 
The other accusations of “illegality” made in the CAIC report target prior 
administrations, which are charged with having violated either mostly unspecified 
Ecuadorian laws or “basic principles of international law.” Some examples of these 
transgressions are that prior administrations agreed to submit debt contracts to 
foreign jurisdiction (namely, New York and English law), waive Ecuador’s 
sovereign immunity, and accept conditions imposed by official multilateral agencies 
“in violation of basic principles of international law such as the equality of sovereign 
states, the self-determination of peoples, the non-interference in the internal affairs of 
nations, the right to [economic] development, and the respect of human rights.”27 
There are also multiple accusations of “irregularities,” like the fact that prior 
administrations pre-paid debts (in the context of debt refinancing agreements) when 
they were under no obligation to do so, or that the government took over 
private-sector obligations in 1983-84, in the midst of a major economic crisis, 
without auditing the beneficiaries to check whether their obligations indeed were still 
outstanding.
28
 
The CAIC report also censures loans obtained from foreign bilateral and 
multilateral agencies on a variety of grounds. For example, funding from the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank was used to purchase collateral to 
back the Brady bonds, “thereby aiding and abetting the reallocation of funds for 
purposes other than those contemplated in the lending programs previously agreed.” 
Also, prior administrations accepted various conditionalities imposed by official 
foreign creditors, did not prevent cost overruns in various projects funded by foreign 
loans, and did not carry out the necessary environmental and other impact studies. A 
number of specific projects were examined and sufficient objections were raised 
about how they were implemented that the CAIC report recommends the repudiation 
of the multilateral loans involved.
29
 
Ominously, the CAIC report criticized prior administrations for having 
“overpaid” greatly when they restructured their foreign obligations, particularly 
during the two bond exchanges in 1995 and 2000. In a mindset that surely was 
inspired by Argentina’s harsh treatment of its bondholders, the report points out the 
costly mistake of recognizing and capitalizing interest arrears, and the failure to 
negotiate with creditors on the basis of prices for Ecuador’s defaulted debt observed 
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in the secondary market. Prior to the Brady bond exchange, the report’s authors point 
out, Ecuador owed $4.5 billion of principal plus $2.5 billion of past-due interest, but 
its obligations were trading in the secondary market at around 25 cents on the dollar, 
so that should have been the discount applied during the debt-for-Brady bonds 
exchange. Likewise, in 2000 the Brady bonds and Eurobonds were trading at around 
30 cents on the dollar, so they should have been restructured on that basis, in which 
case, the report estimates, only $1 billion of 2012 and 2030 bonds would have been 
issued instead of nearly $4 billion.
30
  
 
III 
THE DEFAULT AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
The CAIC report was formally delivered to President Correa on November 20, 
2008, but by then he was well aware of its contents and he had already ordered that an 
upcoming, $31 million coupon payment on the 2012 bonds be skipped. A formal 
default on the foreign debt was declared on December 12, and starting that day, 
Correa would justify the country’s moratorium on the basis that Ecuador’s debt 
obligations were “immoral,” “illegal” or “illegitimate”– preferably, all of the above. 
On December 15, it was announced that an upcoming $30.5 million coupon payment 
on a 10-year sovereign bond that had been issued in December 2005 would likewise 
not be made. However, as the weeks and months passed, it became apparent that 
Ecuador’s default would be highly selective rather than indiscriminate, and that it 
would lead neither to a repudiation of obligations on odious or other grounds, nor to a 
negotiated or even unilateral debt exchange, Argentine-style, for the purpose of 
obtaining massive debt relief. 
President Correa made it clear on December 20 that all obligations to official 
bilateral and multilateral agencies would continue to be serviced in full and on time, 
notwithstanding the CAIC’s damning report and his own prior announcement that 
even debts deemed “legitimate” would be subject to a restructuring. He and his 
finance minister, María Elsa Viteri, explained before and after that New Year’s that 
the default would be confined to the “commercial” debt, meaning Ecuador’s three 
sovereign bonds. However, in mid-January 2009, the government surprisingly 
decided to pay the coupon on the 2015 bond just before the grace period ran out, 
saying that this issue was different from the other two – despite the fact that the CAIC 
report had condemned the 2015 bond right along the others.
31
 By February it became 
clear that the government was really only targeting the two bonds that Correa had 
been despising for years, and thus it came as no surprise when the government failed 
to pay $135 million in interest due on the 2030 bonds. 
The way the Correa administration went about dealing with these undesirable 
obligations was to buy them back from intimidated investors, indirectly at first and 
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then directly, paying cash for a fraction of their face value (or, rather, pre-default 
market value), for the purpose of extinguishing them. The government reportedly 
began to purchase the 2012 bonds in the secondary market after their price collapsed 
following the mid-November decision to default on them, using an Ecuadorian bank 
(allegedly, Banco del Pacífico, acting through a broker) as the front man.
32
 It then 
continued repurchasing its securities after defaulting on the 2030 bond, such that by 
one estimate the government picked up as much as half of the two bond issues in this 
manner.
33
 On April 20, 2009, the government announced a buyback offer to 
repurchase the 2012 and 2030 bonds through a modified Dutch auction with a base 
price of 30 cents on the dollar of face value.
34
 A disclosure document was circulated 
by the deal’s manager, Lazard Frères, with an expiration date of May 15 for all 
offers, and it made it plain that Ecuador had “no intention of resuming payments on 
these bonds following the expiration date.” 35  Despite an attempt to organize 
resistance among bondholders, in the event, 91percent of the bonds outstanding were 
tendered – including those in government hands, presumably – and were bought back 
at a discount of between 65 and 70 percent, thereby retiring nearly $3 billion in bonds 
for around $900 million in cash payments. Holdouts were then offered another 
chance to tender at 35 cents on the dollar, and in November 2009, an offer aimed at 
Italian investors was launched on identical terms, such that, by the end of 2009, the 
government had successfully bought back about 95 percent of the 2012 and 2030 
bonds.
36
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Obviously, this manner of dealing with a sovereign’s debt burden hinges on 
having more ample cash resources on hand than necessary to meet the interest 
payments falling due. It is neither an affordable strategy for a sovereign that is 
experiencing an acute liquidity crisis, nor a smart strategy for a solvent sovereign 
able to refinance its obligations at lower interest rates – the far more common 
situations encountered in the practice of sovereign international finance. It also 
presupposes attaching little cost to damaging Ecuador’s (already tattered) reputation 
as a debtor, as well as having no intention of regaining access to the international 
bond markets – at least not for many years. The government of Ecuador had been 
able to tap the international bond markets on one occasion (in December 2005), six 
years after its prior (1999) default, when the bond maturing in 2015 was issued. And 
indeed, the Correa administration has made it known that it does not intend to return 
to the international private capital markets, but to rely instead on external financing 
from governments such as China, Iran and Russia, and from official multilateral 
agencies – preferably other than the IMF and the World Bank, regarded with 
long-standing animosity by President Correa.
37
 
Evidently, the authorities did not care that their default would cause collateral 
damage, triggering capital flight and impairing the ability of Ecuadorian banks and 
corporations to access financing from foreign commercial creditors at a time of 
global financial turmoil. According to central bank data, the private sector in 
Ecuador was able to borrow much less from abroad after the default than it had 
borrowed before, such that the stock of its external debt obligations dropped by over 
15 percent between September 2008 and December 2009 (because repayments 
exceeded disbursements).
38
 And surveys of foreign banks’ exposure to banks and 
corporations in Ecuador reveal an absolute drop of 12 percent in the year after 
September 2008, versus a fall of 6 percent to these obligors throughout Latin 
America during the same period.
39
 
As concerns the posture of the United States and other leading governments, and 
also of the multilateral organizations based in Washington and in Latin America, the 
deplorable fact is that no government or official multilateral agency went on record 
to express any dismay at Ecuador’s latest default and related bond market 
manipulation. On the contrary, the local representatives of the regional development 
                                                                                                                                                                  
billion at the end of 2008 to $223 million as of end-2009, a 93 percent reduction; see Ministerio de 
Finanzas del Ecuador, Boletines Deuda Externa, December 2008 and December 2009, Excel Table 
#1, available at 
http://mef.gov.ec/stgcPortal/inicio.jsp?page=/faces/common/resumenEjecutivo.jsp&id=90. 
37
 Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, Boletín de Prensa #32, November 18, 2009, available at 
http://mef.gov.ec/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/MINISTERIO_ECONOMIA_FINANZAS_ECUADOR/SUBSECR
ETARIAS/SUBSECRETARIA_GENERAL_DE_COORDINACION/COORDINACION_DE_COMUNICACION_S
OCIAL/PRODUCTOS_COMUNICACION_PRENSA/BOLETINES_DE_PRENSA/BOLETINES_2009/BOLETIN
ES/BOLETIN32_19_NOV_2009.PDF. In 2007, President Correa expelled both the World Bank’s and 
the IMF’s resident representatives in Ecuador. 
38
 Banco Central del Ecuador, Información Estadística Mensual #1895, January 2010, Excel Table 
3.3.2, available at http://www.bce.fin.ec/frame.php?CNT=ARB0000006. 
39
 Calculated by the author on the basis of data in Bank for International Settlements, Consolidated 
International Claims of BIS Reporting Banks, Tables 9A:A and 9A:G up to 2009Q3, available at 
http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm. 
16 
 
banks uttered words of moral support, and their headquarters provided an indirect 
blessing to the default and debt buyback by ramping up their lending to the 
government – despite an obvious deterioration in Ecuador’s creditworthiness and 
macroeconomic fundamentals during 2009. “The good results obtained [in the 
restructuring] will benefit all Ecuadorians during difficult times,” the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s representative in Quito, Carlos Melo, said in a statement. “The 
IADB reiterates its predisposition to work alongside Ecuadorians to promote 
economic development.”40 Sure enough, the IADB stepped up its approvals of new 
loans for Ecuador – nearly thirty projects since the December 2008 default and 
through the end of 2009, including the first tranche of a $1 billion loan for a 
road-building and maintenance program. The IADB approved $515 million in new 
loans during 2009, versus a mere $50 million in 2008, and it disbursed nearly twice 
as much to Ecuador in 2009 as it had done in 2008. 
The Colombia-based Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), for its part, made a 
general-purpose $480 million loan to Ecuador in July 2009, whereas it had not lent 
anything to the government in 2008. And the Venezuela-headquartered Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF) approved $460 million in loans to the Correa 
administration during 2009, plus another $259 million in early January 2010 – a 
meaningful increase from loan approvals of $345 million during 2008. The CAF’s 
representative in Quito, Luis Palau-Rivas, was quoted as saying in May 2009 that the 
regional lender saw the defaulted debt restructuring “positively because it’s a 
voluntary process [that is] helping to solve a difficult situation ... and will benefit 
everyone.”41 The idea that what Ecuador’s bondholders were participants in “a 
voluntary process” is ludicrous, of course, as one veteran financial reporter rightly 
commented at the time, since the bondholders had no say whatsoever in the unilateral 
destruction of the value of their investments, and their only “choice” was whether to 
accept Ecuador’s risible offer or to hold onto defaulted Ecuadorian paper 
indefinitely.
42
 All told, the multilateral agencies disbursed nearly $860 million to the 
government of Ecuador in 2009, 152 percent more than the $340 million they had 
disbursed during 2008.
43
 
The Correa administration requested no loans or other support from the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank during 2008 or 2009, and probably did 
not consult with them, either. However, when a reporter asked the Fund about its 
attitude towards Ecuador’s default, the institution’s spokeswoman lamely said: “It is 
longstanding Fund policy to encourage our members to, wherever possible, be 
current in servicing debt obligations, and when they are economically unsustainable 
to enter into productive negotiations [with their creditors]. We understand that 
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Ecuador’s decision to default on these bonds is based on a dispute about [their] legal 
validity rather than [on] debt sustainability [grounds], and of course we don’t take 
sides on the merits.”44 
All things considered, the tacit approval of Ecuador’s default on the part of the 
official community is deeply troubling, because as mentioned at the outset of this 
essay, in practice only governments and multilateral organizations, rather than any 
group of private-sector bondholders, banks or suppliers, could have tried to rein in a 
wayward sovereign debtor such as Ecuador in 2008-09 – or such as Argentina during 
2002 to the present, for that matter. As became evident in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
again during the recent global financial crisis, the official community is the only one 
that can exercise the kind of collective diplomatic pressure, and put forth the 
financial incentives and disincentives bilaterally and through the multilateral 
agencies, to motivate sovereigns to comply with their financial obligations – or at 
least to treat private creditors in a relatively responsible manner. This much was 
obvious even before the many pyrrhic victories obtained in the courts in New York 
and Europe by bondholders in the wake of Argentina’s gigantic default. Legal 
precedents and plenty of indenture innovations notwithstanding, even the best of 
contract intentions cannot prevent investors from going through a hellish experience 
at the hands of a sovereign debtor unwilling to honor the spirit and the letter of its 
legal commitments. 
Interestingly, just as Ecuador’s selective default and buyback attracted no 
opprobrium in official or multilateral circles, it did not gather any plaudits from the 
debt cancellation movement, either. During 2007-08, virtually all national, regional 
and international NGOs agitating for the massive forgiveness of developing-country 
debt hailed Ecuador’s decision to conduct a thorough “independent” audit of its 
external indebtedness. Dozens of such organizations sent an open letter to President 
Correa in 2008 expressing their support for the audit, and favorable declarations 
along the same lines were made by, among others, legal experts meeting in Quito that 
July as well as by participants in a symposium on illegitimate debt that gathered in 
Oslo in October 2008.
45
 However, to our knowledge, not one of these organizations 
has expressed its approval of how Ecuador went about dealing with the results and 
recommendations of the CAIC audit. In fact, a November 2009 meeting of nearly 
thirty organizations (including CADTM, CLAI, Jubilee and LATINDADD) – in 
Ecuador, of all places – made no mention in its “Guayaquil Declaration” of how the 
host country had dealt with its “immoral,” “illegal” and “illegitimate” debt 
obligations.
46
  
This deafening silence on the part of the advocates of across-the-board debt 
cancellation is understandable. The case of Ecuador is not one that lends itself to 
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argue in favor of repudiation on “odious debt” or related grounds. To begin with, the 
country has been under continuous civilian, constitutional rule since mid-1979, and 
while it has been mismanaged, it was not plundered by an egomaniacal dictator. The 
greatest build-up in foreign public indebtedness took place during 1980-1994, when 
the stock of obligations (including arrears) skyrocketed from less than $3 billion to 
nearly $14 billion, even tripling in relation to rising government revenues and GDP. 
During this extended period, duly elected civilians were in charge, none of whom has 
been found guilty of any illegal conduct. Issues of state succession, war-related 
debts, widespread corruption, the absence of informed consent, or collusion on the 
part of creditors to divert funds for contrary purposes – none of these criteria seem 
applicable here. And the charges of illegitimacy made by the CAIC and President 
Correa are not the ones that are usually offered as strong arguments for debt 
cancellation, such as obligations that involve predatory terms, cannot be serviced 
without violating basic human rights, or go against widely accepted legal, financial 
or ethical standards.  
Besides, what is a supporter of debt cancellation to make of the very arbitrary 
manner in which the Correa administration proceeded, accepting responsibility for 
every loan made to Ecuador by every official foreign lender, even though the CAIC 
documented plenty of irregularities involving many of them? And what about the 
decision to default selectively on two bonds but not on a third one, which the CAIC 
had tarred and feathered just the same? How could someone from that camp express 
approval for a government that spent its “hard-earned money” buying back 
supposedly immoral, illegal and illegitimate obligations, thereby validating them? 
This is the cautionary tale of the bad things that can happen to good sovereign 
debt contracts. 
